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Abstract
In this article we analyze asymmetric two-sided markets. Two types of agents are
assumed to interact with each other and we assume that agents of one type derive utility
from inter-group interactions, while the other type of agents benefit from intra-group
rather than from inter-group interactions as it is assumed in the standard symmetric
two-sided markets model. First, we consider a monopoly platform, then we analyze
competing platforms, both with single-homing and multi-homing abilities.
1 Introduction
According to Rochet and Tirole (2003) many markets with network externalities are two-
sided. These markets are characterized with two distinct sides whose benefits originate from
being able to interact with each other through a common platform. Good examples abound
from credit cards, computer operating systems and video game consoles to job requirement
sites and dating agencies. The core concept behind the model of the two sided markets is
that the utility obtained by each side of the market is crucially affected by the size of the
other side of the market. Credit card holders, for example, gain positive network effect if
their card is widely accepted and merchants that accepts the card are affected positively if
the number of card holders increase.
Although the topic of two-sided markets is well researched (see e.g. Rochet and Tirole,
2003; Armstrong and Wright, 2006; Armstrong, 2006; Weyl, 2010; Hagiu and Halaburda,
2014) to the best of our knowledge little attention has been paid to the asymmetric case
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of such markets. A good example for an asymmetric two-sided market would be the social
media. While it is reasonable to assume that the number of users of a social media crucially
affects the utility gained by the advertisers, the complementary assumption related to
the network effect caused by the advertisers is perhaps secondary. Users most likely join
the social media to be able to interact with their peers rather than to interact with the
advertisers. If this is the case, such markets must be modelled with this asymmetric network
effect in mind since the original symmetric two-sided models might lead to inaccurate
deductions.
In this article we analyze asymmetric two-sided markets. Two types of agents are
assumed to interact with each other and we assume that agents of type 1 derive utility
from inter-group interactions, while agents of type 2 benefit from intra-group rather than
from inter-group interactions as it is assumed in the standard symmetric two-sided markets
model. First, we consider a monopoly platform, then we analyze competing platforms, both
with single-homing and multi-homing abilities.
2 The Model
2.1 A Monopoly Platform
Suppose there are two type of agents (i = 1, 2) served by an intermediary platform. A
member of group 1 benefits from interactions with agents of its own group, while a member
of group 2 cares about the number of members from the opposite group who use the plat-
form.1 That is, we assume that agents of type 1 derive utility from intra-group interactions
rather then from inter-group interactions as it is assumed in the standard symmetric two-
sided markets model, while, agents of type 2 benefit from inter-group interactions. More
specifically, we assume that the utilities of the agents can be given as
Assumption 1 u1 = α1n1 − p1 and u2 = α2n1 − p2
where pi (i = 1, 2) is the price charged by the platform to side i, αi measures the benefit an
agent of side i derives from interacting with an agent of type 1 if the platform attracts n1
members of the type 1. To keep the model as general as possible we allow pi < 0 whenever
is feasible. For example, p1 < 0 means that the platform charges negative price to side 1
in order to exploit the network effect users of that side create.
We define demands as functions of utilities offered by the platform to each type of agent
rather than prices and in order to close the model we assume that2
Assumption 2 ni = Φi(ui)
1For example, one may think of group 1 as the users of a social media platform and group 2 as firms
who want to advertise on the platform. Obviously users derive benefit from being able to interact with
more users, while an advertiser ultimately cares only about the number of users who use the platform.
2Modeling demands as functions of utilities has the consequence that prices are implicitly determined
by equations given in Assumption 1.
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where Φi(ui) is an increasing function of ui. That is, we assume that if the utility offered
by the platform to side i is ui a number of ni members will join side i of the platform.
Furthermore, we assume that in order to serve a member of group i the platform experiences
a ci unit cost and for the sake of tractability we assume that the platform’s fix costs are
equal to zero. More formally
Assumption 3 C(n1, n2) =
∑2
i=1 nici
Based on these assumptions the platform’s profit function (pi =
∑2
i=1 ni(pi − ci)) in
terms of utilities can be given as follows
pi(u1, u2) = Φ1(u1)[α1Φ1(u1)− u1 − c1] + Φ2(u2)[α2Φ1(u1)− u2 − c2] (1)
The first-order conditions for the platform’s optimal pricing problem are
∂pi(u1, u2)
∂u1
= Φ′1(u1)[α1Φ1(u1)− u1 − c1] + Φ1(u1)[α1Φ′1(u1)− 1]
+ Φ2(u2)α2Φ
′
1(u1) = 0
∂pi(u1, u2)
∂u2
= Φ′2(u2)[α2Φ1(u1)− u2 − c2]− Φ2(u2) = 0
where Φ′i(ui) stands for the first order derivative of Φi(ui). Rewriting these expressions,
using Assumption 1, we have that:
Proposition 1 In asymmetric two-sided markets a monopolist platform’s profit-maximizing
prices satisfy
p1 = c1 − α1n1 − α2n2 + Φ1(u1)
Φ′1(u1)
p2 = c2 +
Φ2(u2)
Φ′2(u2)
Hence, the platform charges a price for group 1 equal to the marginal cost adjusted with
the economical value of the benefits an agent creates on each side of the platform and with
a factor related to the elasticity of demand.
Definition 1 Let η1(p1|n1) ≡ p1Φ
′
1(u1)
Φ1(u1)
and η2(p2|n1) ≡ p2Φ
′
2(u2)
Φ2(u2)
denote the price elasticities
of demand given that the platform attracts ni members on side i (where i = 1, 2).3
Using this definition from the expressions given in Proposition 1 we have that the platform’s
profit maximizing prices satisfy
3To simplify notation generally we do not write out the independent variables of ηi(·) and we will mention
them only when it is necessary to prevent misunderstanding.
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Corollary 1
p1 − c1
p1
=
1
η1
− α1n1 + α2n2
p1
p2 − c2
p2
=
1
η2
The second expression is similar to the familiar Lerner formula for monopoly pricing and as
a consequence p2 > 0 in equilibrium, however, the mark-up realized on group 1 is lower than
the one in standard monopoly pricing. A monopoly platform might be willing to sacrifice
somewhat its margin earned on group 1 or even to set a price lower than the marginal
cost in order to motivate agents of type 1 to join the platform which makes the platform
more attractive to members of both groups, which ultimately may increase its profit. This
may happen when the price elasticity of group 1 is high or when the benefit caused by
the presence of a group 1 member either on its own group or on the other group is large.
Furthermore, notice that in equilibrium the platform will always set a price p2 such that
η2 > 1. Interestingly, the margin realized on group 2 and ultimately the price set to this
group explicitly does not depend on the number of members who join the platform from
group 1, even though their utility is solely derived from the ability to interact with them.
However, there is an implicit effect as agents of group 1 affect the price set by the platform
on group 2. As more agents of type 1 are attracted to the platform the utility of each
member of group 2 is increasing and such the platform gets more room to set a higher
price.
Corollary 2 p1 < p2 if the price elasticity of group 1 is greater than the one of group 2,
i.e. η1 > η2, and/or the marginal cost to serve group 1 is significantly smaller than the
one of group 2, i.e. c1 < c2, and/or the benefit enjoyed by the platform’s users caused by
a member of group 1 (α1n1 + α2n2) is large. Moreover, this may happen even if η1 < 1
and/or c1 > c2 and/or α1n1 + α2n2 is small.
The optimal profit of the monopolist platform can be calculated by plugging the optimal
prices calculated using Corollary 1 into the profit function given by (1). This yields
Proposition 2 The optimal profit of a monopolist platform which operates on an asym-
metric two-sided market and attracts ni number of agents on side i is
pi =
n1c1
η1 − 1 +
n2c2
η2 − 1 −
η1
η1 − 1[n1(α1n1 + α2n2)]
Corollary 3 ∂pi∂η2 < 0;
∂pi
∂η1
> 0 if α1n1 + α2n2 > c1, negative otherwise; ∂pi∂αi < 0 if η1 > 1,
positive otherwise.
The intuition behind Corollary 3 is that ceteris paribus the platform’s ability to set higher
prices to members of group 2 gets more and more limited as the group’s demand is getting
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more elastic. However, a more elastic demand of group 1 can be beneficial if the total
benefit a member of this group creates for the users is higher than the cost of serving
this member. This is because if the demand of side 1 to join the platform is very elastic
then a price drop for this group motivates the agents of this group to join the platform
which induces the group members of other type to join the platform as well. And since the
total benefit created by a joining member is larger than the costs to serve this member the
platform pricing accordingly can increase its profit. Yet, ceteris paribus, a large external
benefit created by a joining member of group 1 may hurt profits since in order to attract
this member the platform should offer a discount equal to the benefit this member creates
on the other users and as far as price discrimination is not allowed this discount is enjoyed
by each member of group 1.
In order to compare our results to the ones obtained in the case of standard symmetric
two-sided markets by Armstrong (2006) let us assume symmetry in benefits an agent of
type 1 enjoys by joining the platform, i.e., we assume that η1(p1|n1) = η1(p1|n2) given that
n1 = n
s
1 and n2 = ns2 agents join the platform. In this case we have that
p1 = p
s
1 −
η1
η1 − 1α1n1
p2 = p
s
2 +
η2
η2 − 1α1n1
where ps1, ps2 are the monopoly prices in standard symmetric two-sided markets.
Corollary 4 If η1 < 1 then pi > psi for i = 1, 2, otherwise p1 < p
s
1 and p2 > p
s
2. If η1 = η2
then p1 + p2 = ps1 + p
s
2 and p1 < p
s
1 while p2 > p
s
2.
As one would expect the platform always sets a higher price to an agent whose presence
does not elicit any external benefit. Yet, if an agent benefits only from the presence of
its own type and the demand of this type is elastic the price set in the asymmetric case
is lower then in the symmetric case. This is because in the asymmetric case the marginal
benefit a member of group 1 creates on the platform is higher than in the symmetric case.
Furthermore, since the benefits of joining the platform by a member of type 1 are solely
influenced by the size of its own group, a price change on this side has larger effect relative
to the symmetric case when members of type 1 benefits from the presence of the other
group. Setting a high price for type 1 influences the size of group 2 which negatively affects
the incentives for type 1 to join the platform. In other words, the platform is more limited
in its pricing when benefits of joining the platform of a type 1 are affected by the size of
the other group despite the fact that the demand is inelastic. Interestingly, if the price
elasticities of demands are equal the total price (p1 + p2) set by a monopoly platform with
asymmetric two-sided market equals the total price the monopolist would set in symmetric
two-sided market, however, the price distribution among the two sides is different. Corollary
4 suggests that the platform with asymmetric two-sided market should subsidize agents
whose presence creates utility on the other side of the market with a subsidy equal to the
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total benefit one agent may obtain from interactions. However, the optimal price strategy
indicates that this subsidy is payed not by the platform, but by the agents from the other
side of the market.
Comparing the profit a monopolist platform realizes in an asymmetric two-sided market
to the profit achieved in the standard symmetric two-sided markets by Armstrong (2006)
we have that
∆pi ≡ pi − pis = α1n1
(
n2
η2
η2 − 1 − n1
η1
η1 − 1
)
(2)
Corollary 5 pi > pis if the price elasticity of group 2 is small relative to the one of group
1 and/or the group of type 2 is significantly larger than the group of type 1.
The intuition behind this result is that in the asymmetric case the platform makes its profit
mostly on group 2. Since the size of group 2 is not influencing the utility and consequently
the willingness-to-pay of the group 1 the platform sets its price to group 2 solely based on
the demand of group 2.
Let us now compare our results to the social optimum outcome. In order to do this we
define total welfare as follows
Definition 2
W (u1, u2) ≡ pi(u1, u2) +
2∑
i=1
vi(ui) (3)
where vi(ui) is the consumer surplus of group i and satisfies the v′i(ui) = Φ1(u1) condition
for i = 1, 2.
Taking the first-order conditions of (3) with respect to utilities we have that the welfare
maximizing outcome satisfies the following conditions
∂W (u1, u2)
∂u1
= Φ′1(u1)[2α1Φ1(u1) + α2Φ2 − u1 − c1] = 0
∂W (u1, u2)
∂u2
= Φ′2(u2)[α2Φ1(u1)− u2 − c2] = 0
Apart from the trivial solutions when Φ′i(ui) = 0 for any i = 1, 2, we have that
Proposition 3 In the case of asymmetric two-sided markets the welfare maximizing prices
satisfy
pw1 = c1 − α1n1 − α2n2
pw2 = c2
and the optimal welfare equals to
W opt = n1(α1n1 − c1) + n2(α2n1 − c2)
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Proposition 3 suggests that in the welfare optimum agents of type 1 pay a price less than
the cost of offering them the service and the difference equals the total benefit one agent
creates for the other members using the platform.
Corollary 6 A profit maximizing monopoly platform always sets higher prices for each type
of agent than the welfare maximizing prices, i.e. pi > pwi for every i = 1, 2.
2.2 Competitive Platforms with Single-Homing
In order to examine the optimal strategies of platforms in a competitive environment, let
us introduce an other platform and assume that the two platforms, A and B, compete with
each other in a differentiated market. For the sake of simplicity we assume symmetric firms
with the same costs functions, that is
Assumption 4 cAi = c
B
i = ci.
Agents’ utilities, uji (where i,= 1, 2 and j = A,B), are determined in a similar way as
it is assumed in Assumption 1, given that platform j attracts nji number of members on
side i of the market and the prices set by platforms are pji . More specifically
uA1 = α1n
A
1 − pA1 ; uA2 = α2nA1 − pA2
uB1 = α1n
B
1 − pB1 ; uB2 = α2nB1 − pB2 (4)
However, in order to consume each agent has to travel to a platform and by doing this faces
a transportation cost represented by ti > 0. One may think of ti as the measure of product
differentiation on side i of the market, with ti being close to zero we assume that platforms
offer homogeneous services, while with large ti we assume that platforms effectively serve
different markets. We assume that agents are uniformly distributed along a unit line with
the two platforms located at the end-points. That is, each agent is identified by a point
on the unit line and this point corresponds to her most preferred brand. Furthermore,
we assume, that on each side of the market agents join only one platform (known in the
literature as single-homing) and in equilibrium each agent realizes positive utility, i.e., every
agent is willing to join a platform. More formally
Assumption 5 α2 ≥ max
{
c1 +
3
2(t1 − α1), 2c2 + 3t2
}
The first part of the assumption ensures that agents of type 1 realize non-negative utility
in equilibrium, while the second part is needed for the same reason in case of agents of type
2.4
4Alternatively, this assumption could be substituted with an assumption about the existence of a large
intrinsic value, v0i , an agent of type i = 1, 2 receives by joining a platform, as is in e.g. Armstrong and
Wright (2006).
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The total number of agents of type i a platform serves is determined by the location
of the agent who is indifferent between joining platform A or B, given that platforms
offer {uAi , uBi } utilities. That is, agents situated on the left-hand side of the indifferent
consumer join platform A, while agents on the right-hand side join platform B. Denoting
the indifferent agent’s location by x˜i we have that
uAi − tix˜i = uBi − ti(1− x˜i)
from which
x˜i =
1
2
+
uAi − uBi
2ti
(5)
Since the market is fully covered, we have that nAi = x˜i and n
B
i = 1 − x˜i. Using (4) and
(5), the market shares can be given with the following implicit functions
nA1 =
1
2
+
α1(2n
A
1 − 1)− (pA1 − pB1 )
2t1
; nB1 = 1− nA1 (6)
and
nA2 =
1
2
+
α2(2n
A
1 − 1)− (pA2 − pB2 )
2t2
nB2 = 1− nA2 (7)
Solving the equation system given by (6) and (7) yields that the market shares of each
platform, given that platform A and B set {pA1 , pA2 } and {pB1 , pB2 }, respectively, are as
follows
nA1 =
1
2
− p
A
1 − pB1
2(t1 − α1)
nA2 =
1
2
− α2(p
A
1 − pB1 )
2t2(t1 − α1) −
pA2 − pB2
2t2
(8)
and
nB1 = 1− nA1
nB2 = 1− nA2 (9)
Platforms’ profits are calculated as
pij = nj1(p
j
1 − c1) + nj2(pj2 − c2) for j = A,B (10)
The necessary and sufficient assumption for the concavity of profit functions is the following
Assumption 6 t1 − α1 > α
2
2
4t2
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The same assumption is needed for the existence of market-sharing equilibria, in which,
each platform makes at least non-negative profit.
Plugging into (10) the equilibrium market shares given by (8) and (9) we have that the
profit maximizing prices satisfy
∂piA
∂pA1
=
α2(p
A
2 − c2)− t2(t1 − α1 + c1 − 2pA1 + pB1 )
2t2(t1 − α1) = 0
∂piA
∂pA2
=
α2(p
A
1 − pB1 )− (t1 − α1)(t2 + c2 − 2pA2 + pB2 )
2t2(t1 − α1) = 0
∂piB
∂pB1
=
α2(p
B
2 − c2) + t2(α1 − c1 − t1 − pA1 + 2pB1 )
2t2(t1 − α1) = 0
∂piB
∂pB2
=
α2(p
B
1 − pA1 ) + (t1 − α1)[t2(−1)− c2 − pA2 + 2pB2 ]
2t2(t1 − α1) = 0
which leads to
Proposition 4 Symmetric platforms operating on an asymmetric two-sided markets serve
half the agents of each type, set prices as
pA1 = c1 + t1 − α1 − α2
pB1 = c1 + t1 − α1 − α2
pA2 = c2 + t2
pB2 = c2 + t2
and make profit of
pij =
t1 + t2 − α1 − α2
2
for j = A,B.
Hence, platforms charge the agents of type 1 a price which equals with the costs adjusted
downward with the value of benefits an agent creates for other users. Prices charged to
agents of type 2 exhibit the same pattern as prices charged to type 1, however, without the
discount due to the benefits created for other users. Notice, that Assumption 6 guaranties
that profits are positive in equilibrium. Furthermore, as we can see from the equilibrium
profits network effects negatively affect firms’ profits. The reason is that with external
benefits created by users platforms have an additional reason to compete harder which at
the end hurts profits.
Rearranging formulas describing the optimum prices and using the price elasticities of
demand, which equal ηi = piti in Hotelling specification given firms symmetric locations and
equal market-shares, we have that
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Corollary 7
p1 − c1
p1
=
1
η1
− 2(α1n1 + α2n2)
p1
p2 − c2
p2
=
1
η2
Corollary 1 and 7 implies that competing platforms consider the external benefit created
by a user of type 1 with a higher weight in their pricing strategies than a monopolist. This
is because an addition user of type 1 makes the platform more attractive not just for the
new joining members, but also for the users who are using the other platform. As we can
see from the expressions competition takes place fully on the type 1’s side of the market
and on the other side platforms even though they perform in a competing environment still
price as a monopoly platform would do. As the number of users joining the platforms’ side
1 determines the demand for side 2, after competition evolves on side 1 platforms can act
as monopolist on side 2.
Corollary 8 pj2 > p
j
1 for every j = A,B whenever c1 + t1 < c2 + t2 − α1 − α2
Corollary 8 suggests that if the firms locations are symmetric the prices charged to group
2 are always greater than prices set to agents of type 1 if the difference in costs of serving
a type 1 relative to type 2 is not greater than the value of benefits these agents create. In
other words, platforms charge the group of type 1 more aggressively if the benefits caused
by the group are large or/and the brand differentiation is less relative to market side with
group 2 agents.
Corollary 9 pj1 = p
j,s
1 −α1 and pj2 = pj,s2 +α1, where pj,s2 stands for the equilibrium prices
set by platform j = A,B on symmetric two-sided-markets with platforms’ locations at the
end-points.
As we can see a similar pattern evolves here as in the monopoly case. Even though the total
price set by a duopolist is similar to the price set by a monopoly, the price distribution is
different. In order to attract agents of type 1 platforms set a lower price on this side of the
market and charge a higher price equal to the discount a member of group 1 enjoys to the
other side.
Corollary 10 pij = pij,s for every j = A,B, where pij,s stands for the profit earned by
platform j operating on a symmetric two-sided markets.
2.3 Competitive Platforms with Partial Multi-Homing
So far we assumed that each agent of type i is able to join only one platform. Now, we extend
our model to the case when agents of type 2 can join any of the platforms if they decide to.
As agents of type 1 consider brand differentiation more relevant than network externalities,
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as assumed by Assumption 6, they tend to single-home, which gives an incentive to agents
of type 2 to multi-home in order to maximize their external benefit. This is because users of
type 2 solely benefit from the presence of the other type of agents no matter which platform
they use. On the other hand, it is not rational to multi-home on side 1. This is because,
if everyone on the side 1 would multi-home any agent of type 1 would have an incentive to
join only one platform.
To determine profits maximizing prices each platform charges in this case, first consider
the market size each platform serves. Since agents of type 1 single-home the analysis
relevant to this side of the market presented in the previous section still holds. However,
as agents of type 2 can multi-home the assumption of nB2 = 1 − nA2 is no longer valid. To
determine the demand each platform faces consider the following. If an agent of type 2
located at x joins platform A receives a utility of uB2 − t2x, while if she joins platform B
her utility is uA2 − t2(1− x). If, however, this agent multi-homes and joins both platforms
her utility is uA2 − t2x+ uB2 − t2(1− x). Thus, each agent with location characteristics for
which uA2 − t2x+ uB2 − t2(1− x) ≥ uA2 − t2x is satisfied prefers to multi-home rather than
to single-home platform A. That is, given platforms’ prices, the indifferent agent’s location
(x˜A2 ) satisfies
uA2 − t2x˜A2 + uB2 − t2(1− x˜A2 ) = uA2 − t2x˜A2
Using (4) this can be rewritten as
x˜A2 = 1−
α2n
B
1 − pB2
t2
(11)
Similarly, the agent’s location (x˜B2 ) who is indifferent between single-homing platform B or
multi-homing both platforms can be given as
x˜B2 =
α2n
A
1 − pA2
t2
(12)
Hence, agents with location x < x˜B2 join platform A and agents with location x > x˜A2 join
platform B as it is shown on Figure 1.
The following assumption ensures that agents of any type receive non-negative utilities
in equilibrium.
Assumption 7 c1 ≤ min
{
α2
4t2
(α2 − 2c2)− 32(t1 − α1), α22t2 (α2 − 2c2 − 2t2)− 32(t1 − α1)
}
Furthermore, Assumption 8 guaranties that platforms are willing to serve agents who join
their market and make non-negative profits in equilibrium.
Assumption 8 t1 − α1 > max
{
α22
8t2
, α22z (α2 − 2c2)− 2(α2 − c2 − t2)
}
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0 x˜1 1
Side 1:
0 x˜A2 x˜B2 1
Side 2:
Figure 1: Location of indifferent agents and demands
From (6), (11) and (12) it follows that the demands platforms face on each side of the
market, given that platforms set prices {pA1 , pA2 } and {pB1 , pB2 }, respectively, are as follows
nA1 =
1
2
− p
A
1 − pB1
2(t1 − α1)
nB1 =
1
2
− p
B
1 − pA1
2(t1 − α1)
nA2 =
α2
2t2
− p
A
1 − pB1
2t2(t1 − α1) −
pA2
t2
nB2 =
α2
2t2
− p
B
1 − pA1
2t2(t1 − α1) −
pB2
t2
Plugging these market shares into the profit functions given by (10) yields the following
Proposition 5 Profit maximizing symmetric platforms operating on an asymmetric two-
sided market with partial multi-homing in equilibrium
i) if α2 ≤ 4t2 +2c2, serve half the agents of type 1 and a measure of α2−2c24t2 agents of type
2, set prices as
pA1 = c1 + t1 − α1 −
α2(α2 − 2c2)
4t2
pB1 = c1 + t1 − α1 −
α2(α2 − 2c2)
4t2
pA2 =
α2 + 2c2
4
pB2 =
α2 + 2c2
4
and make profits equal to
pij =
t1 − α1
2
− α
2
2 − 4c22
16t2
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ii) if α2 > 4t2 + 2c2, serve half the agents of type 1 and everyone from group 2, set prices
as
pA1 = c1 + t1 − α1 −
α2(α2 − 2c2 − 2t2)
2t2
pB1 = c1 + t1 − α1 −
α2(α2 − 2c2 − 2t2)
2t2
pA2 =
α2 − 2t2
2
pB2 =
α2 − 2t2
2
and make profits equal to
pij =
t1 − α1
2
+ α2 − t2 − c2 − α2(α2 − 2c2)
4t2
for j = A,B.
If α2 ≤ 4t2 + 2c2 the benefit an agent of type 2 receives by the presence of type 1 is
not large enough to compensate the agent with the longest distance from the platform for
traveling costs, i.e., agents with the highest transportation costs do not want to join the
platform in question. In this case platforms’ profit functions are concave in their own prices
and the equation system defined by the first-order conditions determine the unconstrained
solution given by Proposition 5. However, if the benefit created by type 1 agents are large
enough, i.e.α2 > 4t2 + 2c2, each agent of type 2 wants to join both platforms and prefers
multi-homing rather then single-home a platform. In this case, the platforms’ problem is
a constrained maximization problem where the constraints are given by the non-negative
utility criteria for the furthest agents from the platforms.
Corollary 11 pj1 < p
j
2 for j = A,B.
As one would expect prices on side 2 are always higher than prices set on side 1. However,
Corollary 12 if α2 ≤ 4t2 + 2c2 then pj1 ≥ pj,sh1 and pj2 ≤ pj,sh2 , for j = A,B, where pj,shi
stands for the equilibrium price platform j sets for side i in case of single-homing, given by
Proposition 4. Moreover, if α2 > 4t2 + 2c2 then p
j
1 < p
j,sh
1 and p
j
2 > p
j,sh
2 .
The intuition behind Corollary 12 is that when the benefits agents of type 2 receive from
the interactions with agents of type 1 is small then platforms compete more intensely in
order to capture as large market-share as possible on side 2. This intensifies the direct
competition on side 2 and softens the indirect competition on side 1. As a result prices
on side 1 increase and prices on side 2 decrease relative to the single-homing case. On
the other hand, a large benefit agents of type 2 receive from the presence of type 1 makes
multi-homing attractive. Platforms knowing that agents of type 2 will join both platforms,
they will set prices accordingly and use limit-pricing. This, however, puts more pressure on
the competition on side 1, which decreases prices relative to the single-homing case.
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Corollary 13 pij,sh > pij,mh if α2 > (3 +
√
3)t2 and c2 < α2−2t22 − t2(α2−t2)α2−2t2 for j = A,B,
where pij,sh stands for the profits earned if all agents are single-homing, while pij,mh denotes
the profit when multi-homing is allowed.
This can happen when the benefit created by agents of side 1 on side 2 is sufficiently large,
and as a consequence all agents of type 2 want to multi-home, and to serve them involves
small costs. The reason is that in this case platforms are involved in such a fierce competition
on side 1, that prices are driven down to zero or it even may result in negative prices (if
negative prices are feasible) which eventually hurts profits. This result suggests that in some
cases platforms may have strong incentives to deter agents from multi-homing. One way
to achieve this is by imposing restriction on multi-homing for example with introduction of
exclusive contracts.
Corollary 14 ∂p
j
1
∂αi
< 0; ∂p
j
2
∂α2
> 0 and ∂pi
j
∂αi
< 0 for i = 1, 2 and j = A,B.
Equilibrium prices on side 1 are decreasing in network effects, however, on side 2 prices
are increasing in them. Surprisingly, profits are negatively affected by the increase of these
benefits. The intuition behind this is that as benefits on side 2 are increasing the prices
on side 1 are decreasing since on side 1 prices are more sensitive for a change in benefits
realized by agents on type 2 than they are on side 2. Therefore, platforms need to offer a
greater subsidy for agents on side 1 than they would with a lower network externality.
References
Armstrong, M (2006), ’Competition in two-sided markets’, The RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, 37(3), pp. 668–691.
Armstrong, M. and Wright, J. (2006), ’Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and
Exclusive Contracts’, Economic Theory, 32(2), pp 353–380.
Hagiu, A. and Halaburda, H. (2014), ’Information and two-sided platform profits’, Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Organization, 34, pp. 25–35.
Rochet, J. C. and Tirole, J. (2003), ’Platform competition in two-sided markets’, Journal
of the European Economic Association, 1(4), pp. 990–1029.
Weyl, E. G. (2010), ’A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms’, American Economic Review,
100, pp 1642–1672.
14
